Zero-Knowledge Proofs II zk-SNARKs

Oct. 21, 2019

Overview

- Recap Lelantus
 - One efficient way to do 1-in-N proofs

- zk-SNARKs
 - A general way to prove anything in Zero-Knowledge
 - (if you don't know how to do it any other way, use zk-SNARKs)



Lelantus Mint

Proof: Pedersen Commitment valid





Used serial#

e8fb04ab61cfdd9ab54d9b1 ea6a1728b274a7e3c667523 cdcb04f2b45a6dd3c13e90c 050cf72a2c4ff1f4df4084a 5a35670340e4107632e4629 f59cc4cef45a8063e4afb65 2d28e9bb87f78a5c0b6b008 1c4433bd43daafa3806759b 4f587540daa9bcb002b3699











Used serial#

e8fb04ab61cfdd9ab54d9b1 ea6a1728b274a7e3c667523 cdcb04f2b45a6dd3c13e90c 050cf72a2c4ff1f4df4084a

5a35670340e4107632e4629 f59cc4cef45a8063e4afb65 2d28e9bb87f78a5c0b6b008





Used serial#

e8fb04ab61cfdd9ab54d9b1 ea6a1728b274a7e3c667523 cdcb04f2b45a6dd3c13e90c 050cf72a2c4ff1f4df4084a 5a35670340e4107632e4629 f59cc4cef45a8063e4afb65 2d28e9bb87f78a5c0b6b008 1c4433bd43daafa3806759b 4f587540daa9bcb002b3699 a6e434bb929b8c4d9adf1fb 73f143adf73708de491ff9d 95b96411c8dc99f6be2b443

Used serial# e8fb04ab61cfdd9ab54d9b1 ea6a1728b274a7e3c667523

ea6a1728b274a7e3c667523 cdcb04f2b45a6dd3c13e90c 050cf72a2c4ff1f4df4084a 5a35670340e4107632e4629 f59cc4cef45a8063e4afb65 2d28e9bb87f78a5c0b6b008 1c4433bd43daafa3806759b 4f587540daa9bcb002b3699 a6e434bb929b8c4d9adf1fb 73f143adf73708de491ff9d 95b96411c8dc99f6be2b443



hidden coins (Pedersen Commitments)

Used serial#

e8fb04ab61cfdd9ab54d9b1 ea6a1728b274a7e3c667523 cdcb04f2b45a6dd3c13e90c 050cf72a2c4ff1f4df4084a

5a35670340e4107632e4629 f59cc4cef45a8063e4afb65 2d28e9bb87f78a5c0b6b008 1c4433bd43daafa3806759b



If $c = \mathcal{H}(T | cT + dH + \alpha F)$, then T can be described as a factor of only H and F:

• does not have any *G* components = no money was created or destroyed



Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge

- A general purpose zero-knowledge tool for any computation
 - Need to prove that you know the pre-image of a hash
 - => zk-SNARK
 - Need to build a secret cryptocurrency (e.g. Zerocoin)
 - => zk-SNARK
 - Need to prove that you know XYZ?
 - => zk-SNARK

- A general purpose zero-knowledge tool for any computation
 - Very useful, highly relevant, but quite complicated
 - We will give a high-level overview of how this works
 - a complete discussion could be an entire semester

- Perform the computation storing any intermediate value
 - All values of all variables, called the *witness*
- We encode the witness as a polynomial function w(x)
- We show that w(x) can divide c(x), the constraint polynomial
 - Only if $a(x) \cdot w(x) = c(x)$ is the *witness* valid
 - If the witness is valid, the program was executed correctly

- The trick is showing $a(x) \cdot w(x) = c(x)$
 - We show $a(x) \cdot w(x) c(x) = 0$ at a secret position x
 - Encode polynomials *a*, *w*, *c* and position *x* via ECC

- Alice wants to convince Bob that she executed a program
- Alice creates the witness w(x)
- Bob choses a position x_{eval} and verifies $a(x_{eval}) - w(x_{eval}) - c(x_{eval}) = 0$

Evaluating two polynomials at a random position is enough to check for equality



All that's left to do

- Represent the proof of executing a program as a proof that I know a divisor of a polynomial
- Encode the proof w(x)a(x) = c(x) in ECC

Proof of Knowledge of Division

- Points can be added and multiplied
- given 3 points A = aG, B = bB, C = cG, D = dG, I can encode the polynomial $ax^3 + bx^2 + cx + d$

$$x^3A + x^2B + xC + D$$

 The details on how to do the polynomial checks are beyond the scope of today's lecture

Proof of execution

- Computers run on hardware
 - Theoretically, we can simulate any program with looking at the binary circuits
- 1. Represent the computation as a binary circuit
 - Or algebraic circuit for pure math problems
- 2. Reduction to a Rank 1 Constraint System (R1CS)
- 3. Representation as a Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP)

Program Representation

- Assume we want to prove that we know a value x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)
- Other applications:
 - I know a value x so that $\mathscr{H}(x) = 23d23e1...$ (proof of knowledge of preimage)
 - A secret blockchain: I know a transaction T so that
 - *T* is the blockchain
 - I know the private key/serial# of ${\cal T}$
 - The output is not yet spend

Flattening the computation

Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)

• We can verify all basic operations (+,-,*,assignment)

 \mathcal{X}

 We need to represent the computation as a sequence of basic steps (possibly introducing temporary variables)

 \mathcal{X}

Х

X

 \mathcal{X}

 \mathcal{X}



Flattening the computation

Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)

- 1. $a = x \cdot x$
- 2. $b = a \cdot a$
- $3. \quad c = b + x$
- 4. out = c + 2



List of all variables: 1,x,a,b,c, out

1 instead of 2 as basic unit for all constants



List of all variables: 1,x,a,b,c, out

We can generalize all operations using 3 vectors:





List of all variables: 1,x,a,b,c, out

We can generalize all operations using 3 vectors:

Multiplication: (Example $a = x \cdot x$)





List of all variables: 1,x,a,b,c, out

We can generalize all operations using 3 vectors:

Addition: (Example b = x + 7)



Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)

1.
$$a = x \cdot x$$

2. $b = a \cdot a$

3. c = b + x

4.
$$out = c + 2$$

Loperator
$$(\cdot, +, -)$$
R=OList of all variables:
 $1, x, a, b, c, out$

| | _ | | | _ | | |
|-----|---|---|-----|---|-------|---|
| 1 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| x | 1 | | x | 1 | x | 0 |
| a | 0 | | а | 0 | a | 1 |
| b | 0 | • | b | 0 | b | 0 |
| С | 0 | | С | 0 | С | 0 |
| out | 0 | | out | 0 | out | 0 |

Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)

1.
$$a = x \cdot x$$

2. $b = a \cdot a$
3. $c = b + x$
4. $out = c + 2$

Loperator
 $(\cdot, +, -)$ R=OList of all variables:
1, x, a, b, c, out



Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)

1.
$$a = x \cdot x$$

2. $b = a \cdot a$
3. $c = b + x$
4. $out = c + 2$

Loperator
 $(\cdot, +, -)$ R=OList of all variables:
1,x,a,b,c,out



Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)

1. $a = x \cdot x$ 2. $b = a \cdot a$ 3. c = b + x

4. out
$$= c + 2$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} L & operator \\ (\cdot, +, -) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \end{bmatrix}$$

1,*x*, *a*, *b*, *c*, out



Summarized Constraints

Proof: We know x so that $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3)



Witness

• To proof that we executed the computation for $x^4 + x + 2 = 86$ (hint x = 3) we create the following witness



| 1 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
|-----|----|---|---|---|----|------|--------|--------|------|------|----|---|---|---|---|--|
| x | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| a | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| b | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| С | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| out | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | | | (3 | • 1) | • (3 • | • 1) = | = (9 | · 1) | | | | | | |
| | 1 | 0 | | | | 1 | 0 | | | | 1 | 0 | | | | |
| | 3 | 1 | | | | 3 | 1 | | | | 3 | 0 | | | | |
| | 9 | 0 | | | | 9 | 0 | | | | 9 | 1 | | | | |
| | 81 | 0 | | • | 8 | 81 | 0 | | = | | 81 | 0 | | | | |
| | 84 | 0 | | | 8 | 84 | 0 | | | | 84 | 0 | | | | |
| | 86 | 0 | | | 8 | 86 | 0 | | | | 86 | 0 | | | | |

| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
|-----|----|---|---|------|-----|------|------|-------|------|----|---|--|
| X | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| a | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| b | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| С | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| out | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | | | | (9 • | 1)• | (9 • | 1) = | : (81 | · 1) | | | |
| | 1 | 0 | | | | 1 | 0 | | | 1 | 0 | |
| | 3 | 0 | | | | 3 | 0 | | | 3 | 0 | |
| | 9 | 1 | | | | 9 | 1 | | | 9 | 0 | |
| | 81 | 0 | | • | | 81 | 0 | | = | 81 | 1 | |
| | 84 | 0 | | | | 84 | 0 | | | 84 | 0 | |
| | 86 | 0 | | | | 86 | 0 | | | 86 | 0 | |

| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
|-----|---|----|------|-----|------|----|------|------|-------|------|---|----|---|---|--|
| X | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| a | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| b | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| С | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| out | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| | _ | | (1 • | 1)• | (3 • | 1+ | 81 · | 1) = | : (84 | • 1) |) | - | | | |
| | | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 0 | | | | 1 | 0 | | |
| | | 3 | 0 | | | | 3 | 1 | | | | 3 | 0 | | |
| | | 9 | 0 | | | | 9 | 0 | | | | 9 | 0 | | |
| | | 81 | 0 | | • | | 81 | 1 | | | | 81 | 0 | | |
| | | 84 | 0 | | | | 84 | 0 | | | | 84 | 1 | | |
| | | 86 | 0 | | | | 86 | 0 | | | | 86 | 0 | | |

| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
|-----|---|---|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|------------|------|---------------------------------|------------------|------|---|---|-------------------------|------------------|--|
| x | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| a | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| b | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| С | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| out | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | (1 | 1) | $(\mathbf{)}$ | <u>1</u> г | 0 / | 1) | (06 | 1) | | | | | |
| | | | (1 • | 1)• | $(2 \cdot$ | 1 + | δ4 · | 1) = | = (80 | · 1) | | | | | |
| | | | (]· 1 | 1)• 1 | (2• | 1 + | 84 · | 1) = | 2 |)•1) | | [| 1 | 0 | |
| | | | (] · 1 3 | 1) · 1 0 | (2. | 1 + | 84 · | 1) = 1 3 | 2 0 |)•1) | | - | 1 3 | 0 0 | |
| | | | (1 · 1 3 9 | 1) · 1 0 | (2. | 1 + | 84 · | 1) = 1 3 9 | 2 0 0 | · 1) | | | 1 3 9 | 0 0 0 | |
| | | | 1 3 9 81 | 1) · 1 0 0 | (2. | • | 84 · | 1) = 1 3 9 81 | 2 0 0 |)•1) | — | | 1 3 9 81 | 0 0 0 0 | |
| | | | 1 3 9 81 84 | 1) · 1 0 0 0 | (2. | • | 84 · | 1) = 1 3 9 81 84 | 2 0 0 1 | ··1) | _ | | 1 3 9 81 84 | 0 0 0 0 | |

Witness

Naive approach

- Alice: Create the 3 groups of vectors as constraints
- Bob: Runs the computation, creates the witness
- Alice: checks that the witness fulfills all constraints

• Works, but is slow and uses lots of data

• We encode the constraints and witnesses as polynomials

| 1 | $L_1(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
|-----|----------|---|---|---|---|
| x | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| а | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| b | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| С | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| out | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

We encode the constraints and witnesses as polynomials

L operator
$$(\cdot, +, -)$$
 R = O





- Value t = 1, 2, 3, 4 encodes the step of the program
- We show that for the polynomial L_{-}, R_{-}, O_{-} : $L_{-}(t) \otimes \text{Witness} \cdot R_{-}(t) \otimes \text{Witness} = O_{-}(t) \otimes \text{Witness}$
 - This implies that it hold for all *t*, i.e. all computational steps were done correctly

| $L_1(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
|--------------|---|---|---|---|--|
| $L_{x}(t)$ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| $L_a(t)$ | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| $L_b(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| $L_c(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| $L_{out}(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |

1

X

a

b

С

out

 $L_1(1) = 0$ $L_1(2) = 0$ $L_1(3) = 1$ $L_1(4) = 1$

P(1) = w, P(2) = x, P(3) = y, P(4) = z

buildingBlock₁(t) = (t - 2)(t - 3)(t - 4)



$$\underline{P(1) = w}, \quad P(2) = x, \quad P(3) = y, \quad P(4) = z$$

buildingBlock₂(t) =
$$\frac{(t-2)(t-3)(t-4)}{(1-2)(1-3)(1-4)}$$



1 at t = 1, 0 at t = 2,3,4

• Assume we want

$$P(1) = w$$
, $P(2) = x$, $P(3) = y$, $P(4) = z$

buildingBlock_w(t) =
$$w \cdot \frac{(t-2)(t-3)(t-4)}{(1-2)(1-3)(1-4)}$$

• w at t = 1, 0 at t = 2,3,4

• Assume we want

$$P(1) = w$$
, $P(2) = x$, $P(3) = y$, $P(4) = z$

buildingBlock_x(t) =
$$x \cdot \frac{(t-1)(t-3)(t-4)}{(2-1)(2-3)(2-4)}$$

•
$$x$$
 at $t = 2$, 0 at $t = 1,3,4$

• Assume we want

$$P(1) = w$$
, $P(2) = x$, $P(3) = y$, $P(4) = z$

buildingBlock_y(t) =
$$y \cdot \frac{(t-1)(t-2)(t-4)}{(3-1)(3-2)(3-4)}$$

•
$$y \text{ at } t = 3, 0 \text{ at } t = 1,2,4$$

• Assume we want

$$P(1) = w$$
, $P(2) = x$, $P(3) = y$, $P(4) = z$.

buildingBlock_z(t) =
$$z \cdot \frac{(t-1)(t-2)(t-3)}{(4-1)(4-2)(4-3)}$$

•
$$z$$
 at $t = 4$, 0 at $t = 1,2,3$

• $P(t) = \text{buildingBlock}_{w}(t) + \text{buildingBlock}_{x}(t) +$

buildingBlock_v(t) + buildingBlock_z(t)

•
$$P(1) = w$$
, $P(2) = x$, $P(3) = y$, $P(4) = z$

 1

 x

 a

 b

 c

 out



1 *x a b c* out



| 1 | $L_1(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
|-----|--------------|---|---|---|---|--|
| x | $L_{x}(t)$ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| а | $L_a(t)$ | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| b | $L_b(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| С | $L_c(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| out | $L_{out}(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |

coefficients

| t^3 | t^2 | t | 1 |
|--------|-------|--------|------|
| -0.333 | 2.5 | -5.166 | 3.0 |
| -0.166 | 1.5 | -4.333 | 4.0 |
| 0.5 | -4.0 | 9.5 | -6.0 |
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

| | _ | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--------------|---|---|---|---|--|
| 1 | | $R_1(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | |
| x | | $R_{x}(t)$ | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| a | | $R_a(t)$ | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| b | | $R_b(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| С | | $R_c(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| out | | $R_{out}(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |

coefficients

| <i>t</i> ³ | t^2 | t | 1 | |
|-----------------------|-------|--------|------|--|
| 0.333 | -2.0 | 3.666 | -2.0 | |
| -0.666 | 5.0 | -11.33 | 8.0 | |
| 0.5 | -4.0 | 9.5 | -6.0 | |
| -0.5 | 3.5 | -7.0 | 4.0 | |
| 0.166 | -1.0 | 1.833 | -1.0 | |
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |

| 1 | $O_1(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|-----|--------------|---|---|---|---|
| x | $O_{x}(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| a | $O_a(t)$ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| b | $O_b(t)$ | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| С | $O_c(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| out | $O_{out}(t)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

coefficients

| t^3 | t^2 | t | 1 |
|--------|-------|--------|------|
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| -0.166 | 1.5 | -4.333 | 4.0 |
| 0.5 | -4.0 | 9.5 | -6.0 |
| -0.5 | 3.5 | -7.0 | 4.0 |
| 0.166 | -1.0 | 1.833 | -1.0 |





this is also a polynomial





 $R(t) = 22.166t^3 + 167.5x^2 - 341.33x + 199$



 $O(t) = 11.333t^3 - 102.5x^2 + 300.166x - 200$

Check all Constraints

1 $L_1(t)$ 3 $L_x(t)$ 9 $L_a(t)$ 81 $L_b(t)$ 84 $L_c(t)$ 86 $L_{out}(t)$

L(t)



For t = 1, 2, 3, 4

Check all Constraints

$$L(t)$$
 · $R(t) = O(t)$
For $t = 1, 2, 3, 4$

- We don't make any assumption for the values $t \neq 1,2,3,4$
- More generalized, we can write X(t) = L(t)R(t) O(t)

Polynomials with same roots

• If a polynomial $p_1(x)$ has the same roots than another $p_2(x)$, they divide each other without residue

•
$$p_1(x) = c \cdot p_2(x)$$

- To check that our polynomial X(t) = L(t)R(t) O(t) is zero at t = 1,2,3,4
 - We construct Z(t) = (t-1)(t-2)(t-3)(t-4)

• Verify that
$$\frac{X(t)}{Z(t)} = H(t)$$

Polynomials with same roots

- We compute X(t) = L(t)R(t) O(t)
- We show Z(t) = (t 1)(t 2)(t 3)(t 4) is a divisor of X(t)
 - X(t) is 0 at t = 1,2,3,4
 - Thus $L(t) \cdot R(t) = O(t)$ at t = 1,2,3,4
- Compute $H(t) = \frac{X(t)}{Z(t)}$
 - If the witness were fake, this division leaves a residue
- All that's left to prove is H(t)Z(t) = X(t)

To check all constraints

$$X(t) = L(t)R(t) - O(t)$$

$$Z(t) = (t-1)(t-2)(t-3)(t-4)$$

$$H(t) = \frac{X(t)}{Z(t)}$$

- Instead of H(t)Z(t) = X(t), show H(t)Z(t) X(t) = 0everywhere
- Instead of H(t)Z(t) X(t) = 0 everywhere, pick a secret t and evaluate the 3 functions there (with ECC math)

Summary

- Alice:
 - List an arbitrary computation as a set of basic operations
 - Create L_(t), R_(t), O_(t) polynomials for each input, temporary variables, output and the constant 1
- Bob:
 - Creates the witness vector
 - Computes $L(t) = W \otimes L_{-}(t), R(t) = ..., O(t) = ...$
 - Divides H(t) = X(t)/Z(t)
- Alice:
 - Evaluates the equation H(t)Z(t) = X(t) at a point of her choosing, accepts if 0

Trusted Setup

- This is done non-interactively if Alice encrypts the point *t* as T = tG, and Bob proves that H(T)Z(T) X(T) = 0
- If Bob can break the encryption (or if he breaks into Alices computer), he can find t
 - knowing at which point Alice evaluates H(t)Z(t) = X(t), he can fake a solution
- Coda, Zerocoin, Zerocash, and others use zk-SNARKS
 - We need to trust that the creators do not collaborate with some users and share the secret value t

