

Q&A

Nov 13th, 2019

Pedersen Commitment openings

- A Pedersen Commitment is a combination of 2 (or more) values

$$X = \underbrace{\nu G}_{\text{Secret value}} + \underbrace{\gamma H}_{\text{Blinding factor}}$$

- Even with infinite compute power and the possibility to infer value ν from point νG is it impossible to get ν from X

Pedersen Commitment openings

- A Pedersen Commitment is a combination of 2 (or more) values $X = \underbrace{\nu G} + \underbrace{\gamma H}$
- Opening up means “the value of ν ”
 - Opens to 0 : $X = \gamma H$
 - Opens to 0 or 1: It
 - either opens to 0 ($X = \gamma H$)
 - or it opens to 1 ($X = G + \gamma H$)

ZK-Proof opening to 0

- Given $X = aG + bH$.
- Why is (s, R) so that $sH = R + \mathcal{H}(G | R | X)X$ zero-knowledge proof that $a = 0$?

ZK-Proof opening to 0

Given $X = aG + bF$. (s, R) so that $sF = R + \mathcal{H}(G|R|X)X$

- Assume $a \neq 0$, then $\mathcal{H}(G|R|X)X = \mathcal{H}(G|R|X)qG + \mathcal{H}(G|R|X)bF$
- Then $R = -\mathcal{H}(G|R|X)qG + rF$ so that the G parts cancel each other out

$$sF = \underbrace{-\cancel{\mathcal{H}(G|R|X)qG} + rF}_R + \underbrace{\cancel{\mathcal{H}(G|R|X)qG} + \mathcal{H}(G|R|X)bF}_{\mathcal{H}(G|R|X)X}$$

- $R = -\mathcal{H}(G|R|X)qG + rF$ is impossible, since the output to the hash is used as input (Hash depends on R)
- That only works if $a = q = 0$

**What is the purpose of Σ -
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What is the purpose of Σ -protocol for opening to 0 or 1?

- We use it as a building block
 - Not directly
 - We use the term $f = mx + r$ from the Σ -protocol.
 - x is the output of the hash and r is a secret value. If you know f , you cannot infer what m is, because r is secret. Using the Σ -protocol, however, you have a proof that m is either 0 or 1.

Example

- Assume a 1-in-3 proof
 - $X = uG + xH, Y = vG + yH, X = wG + zH$
 - I know only $Y = vG + yH$
 - I can give you $0X + 1Y + 0Z = Y$, but I want to hide the coefficients
 - Yet you need a proof that each coefficient is 0 or 1

Example

$$X = uG + xH, Y = vG + yH, Z = wG + zH$$

- If we use the Σ -protocol, we get f_0, f_1, f_2

$$f_x X + f_y Y + f_z Z = (m_x x + r_x)X + (m_y x + r_y)Y + (m_z x + r_z)Z$$

- And that is

$$x(m_x X + m_y Y + m_z Z) + \underbrace{(r_0 X + r_1 Y + r_2 Z)}_R$$

- R is independent of x and can be computed beforehand

Example

$$X = uG + xH, Y = vG + yH, X = wG + zH$$

$$x(m_x X + m_y Y + m_z Z) + \underbrace{(r_0 X + r_1 Y + r_2 Z)}_{=R}$$

Example

$$X = uG + xH, Y = vG + yH$$

The protocol to open a coin is now

- I Give $R' = R + \alpha H, v$
- We do 3 parallel Σ -protocols, resulting in f_x, f_y, f_z
- I also provide signature (s, V)
- You compute $Q = f_1X + f_2Y + f_3Z - R' - vG$
 - Thus: $Q = Y + \alpha H - vG = (\alpha + y)H$
- And check if it opens to 0 (via Schnorr-Signature):
$$sH \stackrel{?}{=} V + \mathcal{H}(Q|G|H|V)Q$$

Example

- The protocol to open a coin involves the plaintext value v
- For JoinSplit transactions, we have several input coins and several output coins, but the sum is 0
- 1-in-N protocol for each input coin

- $$\underbrace{x(f_x X + f_Y Y + f_z Z) - R'}_{\text{input coin}} - \underbrace{(vG + \alpha H)}_{\text{output coin}} \text{ opens to } 0$$

- (Lelantus also has a serial number term $vG + sF + \alpha H$)